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Believing  that  inequality  is  inevitable  may  limit  demand  for redistribution.  We  explore
this  idea  with  a survey  experiment  in South  Africa,  one  of the  most  unequal  countries  in
the  world.  Inevitability  beliefs  can  be  influenced  by  learning  about  lower  inequality  else-
where.  We  find  that  the  demand  for redistributive  policies  reacts  to this  information,  while
it  is insensitive  to other  types  of  information/messages.  Our analysis  suggests  a  promis-
ing, and  heretofore  unexplored,  avenue  of  research  for refining  our  understanding  of  the
determinants  of  demand  for  redistribution.
© 2018  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
The rise in inequality in numerous countries in recent decades has renewed academic interest in income redistribution.
In the standard “median voter” framework, increasing inequality should lead to higher demand for redistribution and,
ultimately, to more observed redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Increasing or high levels of inequality would thus
be tempered by consequently high redistribution that would prevent inequality from persisting at very high levels. Evidence
in favor of such mechanism, however, has been scarce (Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Kaufman, 2009). In fact, inequality has
often been observed to persist at high levels, particularly in middle-income countries, giving rise to the concept of “inequality
trap” (Bourguignon et al., 2007).
In response to these observations, a literature has emerged trying to renew our understanding of how levels of redistribu-
tion are determined. An important part of this literature has focused on the demand side: what factors explain preferences
for redistribution? In a review article, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) survey several models and theoretical arguments from
 This research has received funding from the NOPOOR project under the FP7 of the European Commission (grant agreement #290752). We would like
to  thank Martin Abel, Michael Carter, Nahomi Ichino, Ilyana Kuziemko, Ellen Lust, Jim Sallee, and Tim Smeeding for useful comments and suggestions.
This  is a revised version of a paper presented to the NYU-CESS Conference on Experimental Political Science; the UNU-WIDER conference on “Inequality
measurement, trends, impacts, and policies”; the ERSA Political Economy workshop in Soweto, the Toronto Political Behaviour Workshop, the SITES-IDEAS
meeting in Florence, the EPSA Annual Meeting, the Euro-African Conference in Marseille, the IMEBESS conference in Rome. We thank the participants at the
above  conferences as well as attendees at departmental seminars at the University of Bologna, University of California-Berkeley, University of California-
Davis, University of Gothenburg, University of Pretoria, University of San Francisco, and University of Wisconsin-Madison. A supplemental appendix, along
with  the data and replication files, will be available in the online data warehouse of the NoPoor project (www.nopoor.eu).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: miquel.pellicer@uni-due.ie (M.  Pellicer), patrizio.piraino@uct.ac.za (P. Piraino), eva.wegner@ucd.ie (E. Wegner).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.013
0167-2681/© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
t
a
a
s
r
o
o
e
i
S
c
l
n
L
d
i
a
t
t
m
s
i
i
i
n
t
p
A
t
i
a
p
a
“
o
a
e
o
w
a
u
t
w
a
f
i
o
t
r
M.  Pellicer et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 159 (2019) 274–288 275
his literature. Starting with seminal explanations such as the role of expected upward mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001), the
uthors examine a variety of factors from perceptions on the fairness of the income distribution, to political indoctrination
nd historical experiences affecting social norms, among others.1
A recent strand of research investigates the effects of inequality-related information on demand for redistribution with
urvey experiments. Cruces et al. (2013) and Karadja et al. (2017), for instance, analyse the effects of information about the
espondent’s true position in the income distribution. Kuziemko et al. (2015) provide information on changes in inequality
ver time within the United States. In general, these studies find that the effects of providing various types of information
n redistributive demands tend to be small (Kuziemko et al., 2015), or to apply to specific groups in the population (Cruces
t al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017).2
We  contribute to this recent line of research by exploring the consequences of providing information about inequality
n an international perspective, as opposed to inequality within a single country. We  test this via a survey experiment in
outh Africa, a country that has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world. Our suggestion is that such information
an influence redistributive preferences by affecting perceptions about the inevitability of inequality. Observing the (much
ower) level of inequality in other countries ought to increase respondents’ perception that very high inequality is not the
orm—i.e. that high inequality is not inevitable.
Beliefs of inevitability can lead to inaction, as well as to attitudinal changes to reduce frustration and stress (Smith and
azarus, 1990). In particular, poor individuals facing a situation of chronic inequality may  become resigned and demobilized,
emanding little redistribution as a way to cope with such situation. This type of mechanism is likely to be of particular
mportance in high inequality settings, like South Africa. In fact, we find that beliefs about the inevitability of inequality
ppear to be entrenched in our sample: more than half of respondents in our control group agree with the statement that
he high levels of inequality in the country are inevitable. While we  do not have comparable statistics from other countries,
his seems to indicate an astounding pervasiveness.
The survey experiment was conducted in two waves (2014 and 2015) in three low-income townships of the Cape Town
etropolitan area. In order to investigate the potential role of inevitability perceptions on redistributive preferences, both
urvey rounds include three core treatments. The first treatment shows information on “local” inequality: differences in
ncome and asset ownership across various neighborhoods of Cape Town. This treatment is meant to capture the effect of
nformation about inequality on redistributive preferences. The second treatment provides information on South African
nequality in comparative perspective. The treatment shows how inequality is unusually high relative to other (including
eighbouring) countries. This is a key treatment, which intends to affect inevitability beliefs. Indeed, we show that providing
his information reduces the chances of answering that the high inequality in South Africa is inevitable by more than 10
ercentage points.
In an attempt to further reduce the sense of inevitability, we also provided a sub-treatment with video messages of South
frican leaders on the need to fight inequality. These messages are shown to a random subsample after either the “interna-
ional” or the “local” information treatment. The data reveal that this treatment did not significantly affect perceptions of
nevitability. That is, the messages failed to manipulate our key attitudinal variable.3
Our results show that the “international” information treatment leads to an increase in the support for higher top taxes
nd for the introduction of a basic income grant. Providing “local” information, in contrast, does not affect redistributive
olicy preferences. Moreover, we find that this pattern is present in different subsamples (i.e. different population groups
nd waves). The fact that the “international” information affects both inevitability and redistributive preferences while the
local” information does not is consistent with the idea that inevitability can limit demand for redistribution. This pattern
f results also alleviates concerns that the international information treatment works simply because respondents wish to
gree or please the interviewer. The fact that policy preferences do not respond to the local information suggests that this
xplanation is less plausible.
As the treatments convey different information, we acknowledge the possibility that the estimated effects may  relate to
ther aspects of the information provided. This is a limitation of our design that we try to address in a number of ways. First,
e consider the possibility that individuals may  be more misinformed about international inequality. In both treatments we
sk respondents to guess the extent of inequality before showing the true value. We observe, if anything, that respondents
nderestimate inequality more in the local information arm. Second, during the 2015 wave, we  provided an additional
reatment with information on South African income inequality in the same format as the “international” treatment, but
ithout the comparison to other countries. While smaller sample sizes do not allow conclusive inference, this treatmentppears to have no impact on perceptions of inevitability or on redistributive preferences. This suggests that it is the mere
act of putting South African inequality in comparative perspective that affects these outcomes. Third, being exposed to
nformation on South African inequality in comparative perspective could trigger thoughts on the exceptionality of South
1 Tausch et al. (2013) review the experimental (laboratory) evidence on preferences for redistribution, with a focus on lessons that can inform the design
f  pension and social insurance schemes. Similar to Alesina and Giuliano (2011), their paper covers several determinants of demand for redistribution:
hese include altruism, prevailing views about the source of inequality (merit vs. luck), and self-serving biases.
2 Cruces et al. (2013) find an effect for over-estimators. Karadja et al. (2017) report a negative effect for under-estimators, but only for those with baseline
ight-wing ideology.
3 We speculate that this likely reflects low levels of source credibility (Druckman, 2001).
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African legacy of racial inequality. This may  lead in turn to an activation of historical grievances that could drive demand
for more redistribution irrespective of feelings of inevitability. Inspecting two distinct post-treatment questions regarding
race we find no evidence that the international treatment triggers racial considerations.
It is of course still possible that providing information on the much lower inequality in other countries affects some other
unobserved factor that correlates with both inevitability and redistributive preferences, but we are at least able to exclude
some prominent alternative explanations. At a minimum, our experiment points to the relevance of inevitability beliefs for
understanding demand for redistribution. This, we  hope, will open the way  for further investigations on this unexplored
mechanism in this literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short background of inequality and demand for redistribution
in South Africa. Section 3 describes the survey experiment and its design. Section 4 presents the data and descriptive statistics,
while Section 5 shows the results. Section 6 provides a brief discussion and Section 7 concludes.
2. Inequality and demand for redistribution in South Africa
South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world. One might expect redistribution to be high in post-
Apartheid South Africa considering that the origins of present-day inequality lie in a colonial history and Apartheid
institutional arrangements where a white minority enriched itself by denying political and economic rights to a black
majority.
The African National Congress (ANC) came to power after the end of Apartheid, and has governed with large majorities
for the past two decades. For the most part, ANC’s social policies have focused on the rolling out of social grants, such as the
old age pension and the child support grant, on which a large fraction of the population depends to make ends meet. Fiscal
redistribution is, however, only slightly above the relatively low Latin American levels (Leibbrandt et al., 2011).4
Income inequality has not decreased since the advent of democracy (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). Moreover, inequality con-
tinues to follow the Apartheid pattern with the white minority predominantly occupying the top decile, followed by the
Indians, the Coloureds, and the African blacks at the bottom. From the point of view of low-income South Africans, high
inequality may  thus appear entrenched. Not only inequality has had little traction in the policy domain, but it has also
remained virtually unchanged since the democratic transition.5
Against this background of exceptionally high (and persistent) inequality, one might expect to observe high levels of
demand for redistribution amongst the majority of South Africans. However, inspecting a few variables from the 2007
World Value Survey that are typically used in cross-country studies on demand for redistribution reveals that South African
demand is generally comparable to the global average.6
Although an increasing number of service delivery protests suggests dissatisfaction with government performance
(Alexander, 2010; De Juan and Wegner, 2017), such dissatisfaction appears to have not translated into an increased demand
for redistribution. This mixed picture was also confirmed in focus group discussions that were carried out by the authors
between June and October 2012 in preparation for this study. Although respondents were generally disappointed by the
small economic returns of the democratic transition, they largely demanded jobs from the government, not redistribution
through progressive taxation.
3. The survey
3.1. Data collection
The data presented in this paper originate from a survey of 2445 respondents in three low-income townships of the Cape
Town metropolitan area. A first sample of 1644 respondents was  interviewed in March and April 2014–just before the South
African general elections in that year. A new sample of 801 respondents were administered the same questionnaire in March
2015. Across the two rounds, 1731 respondents were surveyed in Khayelithsa, an overwhelmingly ‘African Black’ township,
while the rest of the survey was conducted in Delft (434 respondents in 2014) and Mitchell’s Plain (280 respondents in
2015), which are mostly ‘Coloured’ areas.
The overall goal of the survey was to obtain a sample of South Africans from an urban low-income setting. While repre-
sentativity was not a key concern, we tried to avoid an overly peculiar sample by randomly drawing a set of Enumeration
4 Leibbrandt et al. (2011) find that taxes and transfers decreased the Gini coefficient by around 5 points, which is only slightly higher than redistribution
in  several Latin American countries, where the average is 2 percentage points (Goñi et al., 2011). In contrast, the figure in Europe is close to 20 (Goñi et al.,
2011)
5 Only since 2013, there has been a growing discussion in the ANC leadership regarding the need for a “second transition”, implying that the transition
in  1994 had been a political transition only. Partly, this is due to the emergence of the “Economic Freedom Fighters” (EFF), a new party founded in 2013
by  Julius Malema. The EFF questions the post-Apartheid economic policies and demands the nationalization of mines as well as the redistribution of land
without compensation. In the 2014 general elections, the EFF won  25 seats in parliament (out of 400) with around 1 million votes.
6 The questions we  reviewed in the World Value Survey elicit respondents’ view on (i) whether incomes should be made more equal; (ii) whether
the  government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided; and (iii) whether taxing the rich is an essential characteristic of
democracies.
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reas (EAs) in the three townships. We  then let fieldworkers choose every 12th house in a random walk in the EA, which
ave around 200 households each. In Khayelitsha, EAs were stratified by type of housing: formal vs. informal (e.g. shack
wellers).
An English language questionnaire was developed first and was then translated into Xhosa and Afrikaans. Respondents
ould choose the questionnaire language at the beginning of the interview, which lasted between 25–30 min.7 Survey
esponses were captured on mobile devices and directly transmitted to the server after the completion of the interview
ogether with the GPS location. This allowed for an immediate check of the accuracy of the interview location and monitoring
f data quality.
The questionnaire begins with a number of standard socio-demographic questions (household size, employment etc. . .)
dministered to all respondents. Random subsets of the sample are then exposed to different types of information/messages,
hich constitute our treatment arms. The third part of the questionnaire is again administered to all participants and it
ontains our main outcome variables as well as additional demographic questions.
.2. Treatments
Both waves of the survey had three identical core treatments. The first two treatments provided visual information on
nequality in South Africa in a (i) local and (ii) internationally comparative perspective. The survey also provided a sub-
reatment with video messages of political leaders on the need to fight inequality. These speeches are given in addition to
ither the “international” or the “local” information. An overview of the survey design is presented in Appendix A Fig. A1.
.2.1. Local information treatment
This treatment presents information on differences between neighbourhoods in Cape Town, known to local residents
s comparatively rich or poor areas. The idea is that a certain number of respondents might underestimate the size of the
ncome gap between the rich and the poor in their city and that updating their beliefs may  lead to greater concern about
nequality. In a first step, participants were asked to guess the median income in a typically rich neighbourhood of Cape Town
n comparison to typically poorer areas. Subsequently, they were shown the correct figures for all areas. In a second step,
ifferences in ownership of assets (such as computers, washing machines etc.) in these neighbourhoods were displayed.8
The aim was  to inform participants about the high levels of inequality between neighbourhoods. We  did not include
he respondent’s own neighbourhood in this information as the objective was  not to think about one’s own  individual
ituation but about inequality more generally. Fig. 1 illustrates an example of this treatment. The exact wording used in the
uestionnaire is provided in Appendix B.
.2.2. International information treatment
This treatment presents inequality in South Africa in comparison to other countries. We  will refer to this as the “interna-
ional” treatment. It shows the rich-poor ratio in South Africa, as well as in some other developing and high-income nations.
mportantly, it includes some of South Africa’s neighbouring countries and shows that South Africa’s rich-poor ratio is by
ar the worst among the group presented. The treatment is constructed so that respondents first see the rich-poor ratio in
ifferent countries in form of a ladder and then are asked to guess the ladder’s length for South Africa. The last screen then
hows the correct ladder for South Africa as in Fig. 2.9 The exact wording used in the survey is provided in Appendix B.
Comparing inequality to the much lower levels elsewhere is intended to suggest that South Africa’s inequality is excep-
ional, and not a common occurrence (i.e. a “fact of life”). By providing this information, we  intended to positively affect
erceptions of changeability of inequality, with a potential effect on demand for redistribution.
During the 2015 wave, we interviewed a further 153 respondents that were exposed to a type of information treatment
hat had the same format as the international treatment, but no comparison to other countries was  given. Despite the low
tatistical power on this additional arm, we will report the treatment effects when discussing the plausibility of alternative
nterpretations of our main empirical findings in Section 6.
.2.3. Video messages
A sub-branch of the experimental design takes the form of elite support for redistribution. We  operationalize this with
ideo speeches by members of the South African political elite. One message is by the president Jacob Zuma while the
econd is by Julius Malema, the leader of a new party founded in the early 2010 s (Economic Freedom Fighters). Note that
7 English, Xhosa, and Afrikaans are the most common languages in the Western Cape. A back translation was done with the feedback from fieldworkers.
he  surveyors’ population group corresponded to that of the respective interviewees.
8 We initially programmed the randomisation to have a proportionally higher incidence of the local information treatment to allow for a comparison of
ffects across three different combinations of neighbourhoods. About half-way through the first wave, it became clear that the neighborhood comparison
id  not matter and we  opted for increasing power on the international treatment by re-programming its incidence in the mobile devices. This change will
e  controlled for in each of the regressions in the empirical section below. See Appendix A Fig. A1 for the final sample sizes by treatment status.
9 An initial screen defined the meaning of the ladders shown. Rich-poor ratios were calculated using data from the 2007–2008 Human Development
eport by the UNDP. They refer to the 80:20 income percentile ratios.
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Fig. 1. Example of local treatment.Fig. 2. International treatment.
each respondent is randomly presented with only one video. Overall, we do not observe speaker-specific effects and treat
the videos as a single sub-treatment.10
The speeches are shown after either the “international” or the “local” information treatment. By showing elite support
for redistribution, the video messages were intended to affect perceptions of changeability. Seeing that elites speak against
inequality may  lead respondents to believe that redistribution is a priority amongst policymakers. The hypothesis was that
these messages would amplify any effect from the information treatments.
4. Data
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the different sample areas compared to data from the 2011 population
Census, where available. As shown in Table 1, the key difference between our samples and the Census statistics in these
areas is the larger number of women and unemployed amongst our respondents. This is likely due to men  being more likely
to be employed and absent from the dwelling during daytime. Although fieldworkers were asked to schedule appointments
with the absent person in the household (if randomly selected for the interview by the mobile device), they were only asked
10 The videos were available either in English (the original version) or in dubbed Xhosa/Afrikaans versions to the participants. In the first wave of the
survey, one sub-branch of this treatment provided an additional speech by Archbishop Desmond Tutu (a total of 190 participants saw this video). A decision
was  made not to include Tutu’s video in the second wave as a result of feedback form the field, which indicated that his message was  not seen as a form of
elite  support for redistribution.
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Table  1
Demographic characteristics by area.
Khayelitsha Delft Mitchell’s Plain
Sample Census 2011 Sample Census 2011 Sample Census 2011
Female 0.60 0.51 0.64 0.51 0.67 0.51
Employed 0.31 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.18 0.42
Mean  age 37 40 45
Matric 0.30 0.35 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.18
Informal housing 0.56 0.55 0.15 0.15 0.04 0.04
Government grants 0.39 0.33 0.53
N  1731 434 280
Notes: The sample in Delft includes only sub-places with a predominantly Coloured population. The Census figures, in contrast, are based on information
on  all Coloureds in Delft. The Mitchells Plain sample was drawn from relatively lower-income areas.
Table 2
Key outcome variables in the control group.
Total Wave 1 Wave 2
Attitudes
Inequality problem 0.91 0.89 0.94
Inequality inevitable 0.54 0.53 0.55
Policy  preferences
Support for. . .
Progressive top tax 0.07 0.04 0.11
Basic  income grant 0.64 0.61 0.68
Higher  general tax 0.36 0.33 0.38
Actions  (progressive or regressive)
Petition 0.74 0.65 0.87
SMS  intended 0.58 0.44 0.74
SMS  sent 0.23 0.15 0.34
Notes: All variables are coded as dummy  variables except otherwise stated. “Progressive top tax” is coded as one, zero, and minus one if respondent wishes
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his  tax increased, unchanged, and decreased, respectively. “SMS intended” refers to respondents stating that they would send an SMS, while “SMS sent”
o  those actually sending it.
o return to the house prior to sunset for security reasons. The fraction of high school graduates (matric) is roughly in line
ith the Census and so is the share of informal housing.
.2. Outcome variables
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for key outcome variables in the control group in the pooled sample and by survey
ave. Outcomes include attitudes towards inequality, policy preferences, and “action” outcomes (where respondents could
ransmit their redistributive preferences to local politicians). Unless otherwise stated, variables are coded as binary variables
o that the values in Table 2 represent the shares favouring a certain position/action. The exact wording of these outcome
uestions as well as the full list of post-treatment questions is provided in Appendix C.
Attitudinal outcomes include a question on whether inequality in South Africa is seen a serious problem, as in Kuziemko
t al. (2015).11 Importantly, we also ask respondents whether the high level of inequality in South Africa is seen as inevitable
as opposed to “could be made smaller”). This is a core question, which is meant to capture perceptions of “changeability”.
Tax policy preferences are elicited through questions about the respondents’ support for three hypothetical policy
hanges: (i) an increase/decrease in the top marginal tax rate,12 coded as −1, 1, or 0 if the respondent supports reduc-
ng, increasing, or leaving the rate unchanged, respectively; (ii) the introduction of a universal basic income grant; (iii) a
eneral increase in taxation for all income groups to improve public infrastructures such as schools, roads and sanitation.
Action outcomes include the option to send an SMS  (at a real cost) or to sign an online petition on the surveyor’s tablet.
oth the petition and the SMS  were pre-populated and allowed respondents to express their support (or disapproval) of tax
ncreases for the rich and of the introduction of a basic income grant. While both actions bear a cost − the petition the cost
f exposing oneself by signing one’s name, the SMS  the material cost of sending the message − the item was randomized
11 The question is identical to theirs with one exception: we  replaced the word inequality with “gap between rich and poor” throughout the survey. This
s  because a pilot showed that a large fraction of respondents confused the word inequality with equality, partly as a result of non-unique renditions of the
ord in the local languages.
12 The group of top earners starts with around 60,000 ZAR (about 5000 USD at the time of the survey) per month. As the concept of top marginal tax rate
ay  be difficult to grasp, the question provides a simplified example (see Appendix C for exact wording).
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Table 3
Attitudes towards inequality.
1. Inequality problem 2. Inequality inevitable
Local Info 0.025 (0.016) −0.015 (0.029)
Local Info + Video 0.015 (0.017) −0.023 (0.033)
International Info 0.045*** (0.015) −0.112*** (0.032)
International Info + Video −0.013 (0.019) 0.052 (0.041)
Control mean 0.91 0.54
Covariates Yes Yes
Obs.  2385 2124
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10. Outcomes are dummy  variables.
so as to avoid the possibility of virtually all respondents choosing the petition (as this was free of charge). Moreover, we
distinguish between those saying that they would send an SMS  and those actually sending it.13
Some interesting patterns emerge from the statistics shown in Table 2. The first noticeable insight is the very high share
(around 90%) agreeing with the statement that inequality is a serious problem in South Africa. As a comparison, Kuziemko
et al. (2015) find a control group mean of 28% stating that inequality is a serious problem in the United States. The fact that
inequality in the country is something the vast majority of our respondents consider to be seriously problematic provides
an interesting baseline scenario compared to previous surveys utilizing this question.
The very high level of concern about inequality does not seem to translate in high shares of respondents who  want to
increase taxes for the rich. This suggests that concerns about inequality may  not be sufficient to generate redistributive tax
preferences. In contrast to taxes, support for the basic income grant is much higher.
Regarding the action outcomes, the overall large share of respondents willing to take any form of action (either favouring
or opposing the policy change) is remarkable. This suggests that the actions proposed by the survey resonate with respon-
dents. The willingness to sign a petition is substantially higher compared to sending an SMS. This could be a result of either
the material cost associated with this action or the difference in action “type”.14 The gap between the intention to send an
SMS to express policy preferences and the actual transmission is also noticeable, highlighting the importance of introducing
measurable behavioural outcomes in survey experiments.
Finally, Table 2 shows some noteworthy (and statistically significant) differences in the control group means across the
two waves of the survey. The largest differences are in the action outcomes, with the willingness to act being much higher
in the 2015 survey for all types of actions. The lower figures in 2014 could be related to the survey taking place in the heat of
an election campaign, with respondents possibly being more careful or suspicious about getting in contact with politicians.
5. Results
We  estimate treatment effects on four treatment dummies: local information, local information plus video, international
information, international information plus video. These regressions include controls for age (quadratic), gender, formal
dwelling, completion of matric, employment, and receipt of government grants. We  also include fieldworker fixed effects,
wave and area dummies. When the outcomes are binary, regressions are performed using a linear probability model. Treat-
ment variables are coded so that the coefficients on the video variables are to be interpreted as the effect of the video
in addition to that of the respective information treatment, which is in turn given by the coefficient on the information
dummies.
As randomization was programmed into the mobile devices used for the survey, we should have a priori confidence in
the success of the random treatment allocation. Table A1 in Appendix A shows that this is indeed the case. The various
columns present the coefficients from regressing different socio-economic variables on the treatment dummies. None of the
differences between the respondents in the various treatment arms and the control are significant at the five percent level.
5.1. Attitudes
The treatment effects on attitudes towards inequality are shown in Table 3. The coefficient estimates in Column 1 show
that information on inequality in both local and international perspectives generates an increase in the degree to which
respondents view inequality as a serious problem, although the effect does not reach conventional significance levels for the
local information treatment. This result seems remarkable considering the very high control group mean for this variable in
our sample.
The most relevant results for our purposes concern the inevitability of inequality (Column 2). While local information on
inequality does not affect perceptions of inevitability, the international treatment does, and very strongly so. Respondents are
13 The SMS  was sent to a phone number belonging to the survey company with the indication that we  would let local representatives know what share
of  our respondents were supporting certain policies.
14 A petition can be seen as a civil society type of action whereas the SMS possibly requires a higher level of trust in politicians.
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Table  4
Policy preferences.
1. Progressive top tax 2. Basic Income Grant 3. Higher general tax 4. Summary index
Local Info 0.020 (0.037) −0.010 (0.025) −0.021 (0.026) −0.036 (0.056)
International Info 0.091** (0.042) 0.054** (0.027) 0.032 (0.029) 0.186*** (0.064)
Control mean 0.07 0.64 0.36 0.03
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs  2180 2338 2363 2073
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otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10. The summary index is obtained by first standardizing each outcome (by
ubtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation) and then summing the three standardized variables and divide by the standard deviation of
he  sum (to obtain an index that has a standard deviation of 1).
1 percentage points less likely to think that high inequality in South Africa is inevitable after seeing the much lower income
aps in other countries. We  can easily reject equality of this coefficient with all other treatment effects. Thus, exposure to
nternationally comparative information successfully affects perceptions on the changeability of high inequality in South
frica.
Seeing the video messages of politicians condemning inequality, on the other hand, has no significant effect on attitudes
owards inequality. In particular, the video messages fail to further reduce inevitability perceptions, which was the intention
f our design. Given that the sub-treatment did not successfully manipulate our key attitudinal variable, we  will focus on
he main information treatment effects in the remainder of the analysis.15
.2. Policy preferences
Table 4 shows the treatment effects on the three policy variables defined above: progressive top tax rate, basic income
rant, and general tax increase. We  also aggregate the information across these three variables into a standardized index in
rder to examine the general pattern of results.16
The table shows that the local information treatment has no effect on general redistributive preferences, while the inter-
ational treatment has a positive effect on supporting a more progressive top marginal tax rate and the introduction of the
asic income grant. The international treatment effect is also positive and significant on the summary index. Table 4 provides
 key result of this paper. Providing information about the much lower inequality elsewhere increases the demand for these
edistributive policies. In contrast, providing information about local inequality does not affect these policy preferences.17
Taken together, the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 support the idea that preferences for redistributive policies are related
o views about the inevitability of inequality. This is consistent with the literature on the importance of changeability
erceptions for counteracting attitudes of status quo preservation.
.3. Robustness
It is important to check whether our basic result applies with some generality or is instead driven by a specific group or
ontext. This section thus examines treatment effects by population group and survey wave. We  focus on two main variables:
erceptions of inevitability, and the summary index of redistributive demands.
The main results appear to apply quite generally (Table 5). The estimated effects on the local information treatment are
tatistically insignificant in all groups and always smaller in absolute value compared to the international treatment. For the
wo population groups and for the two waves, the international treatment decreases inevitability perceptions and increases
emand for redistribution. The magnitude of the coefficients is very similar for African Blacks and for Coloureds. Coefficients
n the international treatment are higher in absolute value for Wave 1 than for Wave 2, but we cannot reject equality of
stimates across waves. Interestingly, this pattern applies to both inevitability perceptions and demand for redistribution.
hat is, the subgroup that reacts less to the international treatment in terms of inevitability, does so also in terms of demand
or redistribution.The comparison between sub-groups confirms the main empirical pattern we  highlight in this paper: whenever a treat-
ent affects views on the inevitability of high levels of inequality in South Africa, redistributive preferences are affected
n a consistent way. The finding that our results apply to different groups should also alleviate concerns about multiple
15 The full set of coefficient estimates (including sub-treatment effects) are reported in the Supplemental online Appendix. The effects of the video
essages on the various outcomes are generally insignificant, though inevitability perceptions always negatively co-vary with support for redistributive
olicies.
16 Following Chetty et al. (2011), we first standardize each outcome by subtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation. We then sum the
hree  standardized variables and divide by the standard deviation of the sum to obtain an index that has a standard deviation of 1 (see also Kling et al., 2007;
lingingsmith et al., 2009; for similar approaches). As explained in these papers, the summary measure aggregates information about related constructs.
he  idea is to detect effects that go in the same direction within a domain, not to suggest that the components within a domain are proxies for a single
atent  factor.
17 We can reject equality of coefficients between the local and the international treatment effects in Columns 2 and 4 at the 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 5
Basic results by subgroup.
All African Black Coloured Wave 1 Wave 2
Inequality Inevitable
Local Info −0.015 (0.029) −0.010 (0.036) −0.023 (0.050) −0.035 (0.033) 0.038 (0.064)
International Info −0.112*** (0.032) −0.111** (0.040) −0.109* (0.053) −0.160** (0.047) −0.073* (0.044)
Summary index
Local Info −0.036 (0.056) −0.077 (0.068) 0.103 (0.094) −0.054 (0.065) 0.101 (0.118)
International Info 0.186*** (0.063) 0.199** (0.078) 0.171 (0.107) 0.284** (0.100) 0.158** (0.081)
N  2073 1442 604 1319 754
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10.
Table 6
Action outcomes.
Top tax BIG
Petition SMS  intended SMS  sent Petition SMS  intended SMS  sent
Local Info 0.032 (0.039) 0.033 (0.033) 0.016 (0.022) −0.038 (0.052) −0.017 (0.045) −0.007 (0.035)
International Info 0.101** (0.050) 0.076** (0.037) 0.022 (0.023) 0.069 (0.058) 0.049 (0.053) −0.005 (0.037)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.48 0.40 0.13
Obs  1154 1107 1107 1154 1107 1107
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10. Action outcomes assign value one (minus one), if action is progressive
(regressive), and zero otherwise. “SMS intended” refers to respondents stating that they would send an SMS, while “SMS sent” to those actually sending it.
BIG  denotes basic income grant.
hypotheses testing. If the significance of the estimates in the full sample were the result of chance, we would not expect to
see robustness across sub-groups.
Finally, we directly regress the summary index of redistributive demands on perceived inevitability in the control group.
This estimation delivers a negative and significant (at 5% confidence level) coefficient of −0.155. This suggests that the
negative co-variance between inevitability and demand for redistribution exists outside the experimental framework.
5.4. Actions
An additional goal of the survey was to evaluate respondents’ willingness to bear a cost to act upon their preferences.
To this end, two possible actions were introduced. Respondents were randomly offered to either sign a petition or send an
SMS regarding the increase in the top marginal tax rate and the introduction of a basic income grant. We  construct different
outcome variables by action type (petition, intended SMS, sent SMS) and policy (top tax, basic income grant). Table 6 shows
the treatment effects on variables capturing the progressivity of the action considered.18 As mentioned in Section 4, the
sample sizes for these outcomes are halved, because respondents received the option of implementing either an SMS  or a
petition.
Consistent with the treatment effects on redistributive preferences, the international information is the only treatment
that has some significant effects on behavioral outcomes. The treatment significantly increases respondents’ willingness to
sign a petition and their intention to send an SMS  regarding their top tax preference. Concerning the BIG, the coefficients on
the international treatment are still positive, and of relatively high magnitude, but they are not statistically significant. For
neither policy, however, there is an effect on actually sending an SMS.
The effect of the international information on some of the action outcomes suggests that the changed preferences are
“real”, in the sense that respondents want to follow up on their preferences with politicians. As argued above, petitions −
while free of charge from a material point of view − are not without cost as respondents are disclosing their name. At the
same time, the lack of an effect on actually sending the SMS  shows that these effects may  not carry over to materially costly
actions. While fully acknowledging this caveat, we  believe that the results for action outcomes − with the effects of the
international treatments on a subset of outcomes and the general consistency between attitudinal and behavioral outcomes
− are overall supportive of the robustness of our main findings.19
18 These variables take the value of zero for respondents who do not want to take an action, −1 for those wanting to take an action to transmit a regressive
message (decrease taxes for the rich, not introduce the BIG) and 1 for those wanting to take an action to transmit progressive preferences (increase taxes
for  the rich, introduce the BIG).
19 We explored different definitions of the action outcomes—i.e. by aggregating across issues (BIG and top tax) or disaggregating by progressive/regressive
content. The international information is the only treatment that consistently displays at least some significant effects in any categorization.
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. Discussion
Our empirical analysis contributes to a growing literature in economics that seeks to understand the role of different types
f information about inequality on demand for redistribution (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Cruces et al., 2013, Karadja et al., 2017).
aradja et al. (2017) note that this literature, which focuses solely on within-country information about inequality, provides
ixed results (p.202). Similarly, we find that providing information on local inequality in South Africa has no clear effects on
upport for redistributive policies. The main novelty in our paper, however, is the design of an information treatment that
ompares levels of inequality across countries. We  show that this type of information has positive and significant effects on
upport for redistributive policies.
We suggest that this result is related to individuals’ perceptions about the inevitability of inequality. By providing infor-
ation on the high inequality in South Africa relative to other countries, the treatment suggests that such high disparities
re not the norm—i.e. that high inequality is not inevitable. Indeed, the data show that inevitability perceptions are suc-
essfully manipulated by the international information treatment. The finding that support for redistributive policies only
eacts to the treatment that successfully manipulates inevitability perceptions (while being insensitive to other types of
nformation) points to inevitability beliefs as a potential determinant of demand for redistribution. This, we believe, should
arrant further investigations of this overlooked mechanism in the economics literature.20
The idea that perceptions of changeability/inevitability ought to affect decision-making is straightforward. An individual
acing the possibility to engage in mobilization against inequality will be more inclined to do so the higher the probability
f success. In the extreme, if inequality is perceived as inevitable, such course of action would not be rational. In addition,
erceptions of inevitability can have psychological effects beyond this straightforward mechanism; effects that in turn serve
o cement such inaction. The key to these effects is the notion of “coping”; i.e. how individuals cope with difficult, stressful
r problematic situations. Perceiving that inequality is inevitable and cannot be changed leads to psychological reactions
anging from becoming “resigned”, to justifying existing inequalities as coping mechanisms. These ideas are well grounded
n the field of psychology (see Folkman and Moskowitz, 2004; Smith and Lazarus, 1990).
In particular, a strand of literature within social psychology has provided evidence on the link between perceptions of
hangeability and preferences about social arrangements. The theory of “System Justification” argues that disadvantaged
ndividuals may  engage in a form of belief-altering emotional coping that involves justifying and even legitimizing the
tatus quo (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2004). Studies within this literature have shown that system justification and beliefs
f changeability and efficacy are linked. For instance, in a recent contribution, Johnson and Fujita (2012) show that when
ndividuals believe that the system can be reformed they will try to improve or challenge the status quo, as opposed to
ustifying it (see also Van der Toorn et al., 2015).21
While we believe that perceptions of inevitability can explain the differential effects of our treatment manipulations, we
cknowledge that our international information treatment might generate reactions other than those relating to inevitability.
his, in turn, may  affect demand for redistribution in the observed direction. A first concern, common to survey experiments
n different settings, is that respondents may  feel compelled to “please” the researcher/fieldworker. However, the finding of
o treatment effect for the local inequality information would seem to rule out this possibility. Secondly, it is possible that at
aseline individuals are relatively more knowledgeable about local income disparities compared to international inequality.
o explore this, we asked respondents in each treatment to guess the respective level of inequality before providing the infor-
ation. Comparing guesses with the actual values, we  find that the overwhelming majority of respondents underestimated
nequality in both treatments. For the international treatment, 85% of respondents underestimated the level of inequality,
ith the average guess being about 40% below the mark. For the local treatment, 94% of respondents underestimated the
ap ratio between rich and poor neighborhoods, with an average guess that was  70% below the true value. These figures
ndicate that it is unlikely that the effect of the international treatment on inevitability and redistributive preferences is
riven by a higher degree of belief updating.22
An additional concern is that the local and the international treatments differ in the format and type of the information
rovided—i.e. histograms on neighborhood differences vs. ladders on rich-poor individuals in the country. While it is not a
riori obvious why such difference in layout could lead to the observed results, we  attempted to address this limitation by
nterviewing a further 153 individuals in 2015. These respondents were exposed to a new treatment that is identical to the
nternational treatment, except that no comparison to other countries was  given. The concept of the rich-poor ratio is initially
xplained with a ladder, after which respondents are asked to guess the value of the ladder for South Africa. The actual length
f the ladder is then shown. Guesses provided by respondents suggests a similar processing of this new treatment to that
20 The type of mechanism examined in this paper has recently been shown to be relevant for political behavior. In a context where corruption is high
r  expectations on politicians are low, providing information on politicians (mal)performance or corruption is in itself insufficient to affect behavior. In
ontrast, information on better performance elsewhere can affect the willingness to change the status quo (see Gottlieb, 2016; Bauhr and Grimes, 2014).
21 Trump (2017) uses experimental evidence to argue that living in an unequal environment may  make people systematically more likely to think of
nequality as a legitimate outcome. This appears to occur at least in part because people are motivated to believe that their social system is fair.
22 This is further supported by feedback from fieldworkers documenting that respondents in the two treatments reacted similarly to the ‘visual effect’ of
eing  shown the correct length of the bar after their guesses.
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of the international information treatment.23 Table A2 in Appendix A reports the estimated effects of exposure to this new
type of information on our key outcome variables using only the 2015 wave. For comparison, we also report the treatment
effects of the international information on the same sample. While the sample size receiving the additional treatment is low
and the coefficients imprecisely estimated, the point estimates in Table A2 suggest that this information has limited effect
on inevitability and redistributive preferences.24 In addition, unlike the international treatment, there is no evidence of a
negative co-variance between inevitability and redistributive preferences. These results are consistent with the idea that
the impact of the international information treatment is driven by the mere fact of viewing the lower inequality levels in
other countries, and not by the format (i.e. a ladder) or index (income ratio) used.
Finally, a plausible alternative explanation for our results could be that, by presenting lower levels of inequality in
other countries, the international treatment may  point out South African exceptionality in its history of explicit racial
discrimination. This may  trigger the memory of grievances associated to past racial policies, which could affect demand for
redistribution. This possibility can be investigated by estimating the treatment effects on variables that reflect considerations
linked to race. These post-treatment variables are (i) support for a special extra tax on whites and (ii) associating the picture of
an affluent house to a “white” as opposed to a “rich” person.25 If the international treatment activates grievances associated
to historical racially determined inequality, we would expect positive coefficients for the international treatment, larger
than the ones for the other treatments. Instead, we find no evidence in support of this. If anything, point estimates suggest
a higher effect of the local information treatment on supporting a tax for whites (see Table A3 in Appendix A).
In sum, while acknowledging the limitations of our experimental design, we believe that the evidence presented in
this paper points to the relevance of inevitability beliefs for redistributive preferences. Our analysis sheds light on a novel
mechanism in the literature on redistribution and calls for an increased focus on inevitability/intractability beliefs as one of
the potential missing links in the documented disconnect between concerns for inequality and demand for redistribution.
7. Concluding remarks
Beliefs about the inevitability of inequality can be quite pervasive in contexts, such as South Africa, where high inequality
is a persistent norm. We  show that such beliefs can be influenced by gaining knowledge about lower inequality elsewhere.
Participants exposed to this type of information significantly update their views about inevitability and at the same time
increase their support for redistributive policies. These effects are present for different population groups and for two survey
waves carried a year apart.
Since the treatment effect seems to derive from the mere fact of seeing that inequality in other countries is lower than in
South Africa, we believe that the most likely interpretation of the results is that this makes people think that high inequality
in South Africa is not a fact of life. The significance of changeability perceptions as a driver of redistributive demands
may  shed light on why information on inequality per se—i.e. information that is not anchored to comparisons of what is
possible—might rather encourage resignation or justification of the status quo. A promising avenue for future research would
be to investigate further into the different ways through which inevitability beliefs might affect policy preferences.
Overall, the paper suggests that believing that the situation is impossible to change may  play a role in explaining low
demand for redistribution in high-inequality contexts. This points to the possibility of a vicious circle generating long-term
high inequality. The very persistence of inequality may  induce pervasive perceptions of inevitability, which can lead to low
demand for redistribution and, ultimately, reinforce persistence.
Appendix A.
Table A1
Balance test of treatment and control.
Age Female Matric Employed Informal housing Receive grant
Local Info 1.039 (0.825) 0.010 (0.028) −0.001 (0.026) −0.003 (0.027) 0.008 (0.026) 0.003 (0.028)
Local  Info + Video −0.614 (0.911) 0.009 (0.031) 0.124 (0.029) 0.009 (0.030) −0.039 (0.029) 0.025 (0.031)
International Info 0.825 (0.952) −0.012 (0.031) −0.019 (0.028) −0.054* (0.028) 0.010 (0.028) 0.019 (0.031)
International Info + Video −0.938 (1.213) 0.005 (0.041) −0.015 (0.036) 0.019 (0.037) −0.054 (0.037) 0.026 (0.041)
Control mean 38.3 0.62 0.28 0.32 0.43 0.40
Obs  2433 2445 2439 2441 2445 2436
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions where each column corresponds to a different dependent variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. P-values:
***  0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10.
23 While these guesses are more extreme at the tips of the distribution − to be expected without the anchoring to other countries − the median guess is
again 15, and around 84% of respondents underestimated inequality (as compared to 85% in the international treatment).
24 Because of high standard errors, the differences in the coefficients across rows are statistically insignificant.
25 The introduction of a one-shot extra tax for white South Africans was  proposed a few years ago by the Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu as a
compensation for (dis)advantages resulting from Apartheid-era policies.
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Fig. A1. Survey Design.
able A2
ffects of new local information treatment.
1. Inequality inevitable 2. Summary index
Rich/Poor ladder: SA only −0.032 (0.064) −0.048 (0.123)
International Info −0.074* (0.043) 0.137* (0.074)
Covariates Yes Yes
Control mean 0.55 0.02
Obs. 927 901
otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10. “Rich/Poor ladder: SA only” is a local treatment that provides the same
nformation as the international treatment except no comparison with other countries is given. Results are based on data from Wave 2 only.
able A3
ace-related outcomes.
1. Tax whites 2. House white
Local Info 0.067** (0.027) −0.012 (0.028)
International Info 0.030 (0.030) −0.010 (0.030)
Covariates Yes Yes
Control mean 0.36 0.40
Obs. 2362 2407
otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10. “House white” has value one if respondent answered that an affluent
ouse shown was inhabited by a white person as opposed to a rich one.
ppendix B. Description of Information Treatments
ocal information
We  would like to talk about the differences between the living conditions of poor people and rich people in South Africa.
irst I would like to ask you how much do you think a typical household earns per month in Gugulethu and how much a
ypical household earns in Newlands?
This graph shows the monthly income in Philippi, Gugulethu, Camps Bay, and Newlands. As you can see, the monthly
ncome in Gugulethu is about 1,700, in Newlands it is about 30,000 Rand.
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We  will now also show you differences in what people own in these neighborhoods.
First, we will show you ownership of cars.
Now, we will show you ownership of washing machines
Now, we will show you ownership of computers.
Q: Are you surprised by the differences between Newlands and Gugulethu in ownership of these household goods?
Note that this is an example of the local information treatment provided to one third of respondents. Another third of
respondents were presented with differences across three types of neighbourhoods (Gugulethu/Philippi −Athlone/Mitchells
Plain − Camps Bay/Newlands), and the last third with only the difference between Athlone/Mitchells Plain and Camps
Bay/Newlands.
International information
We  would now like to show you some information about the income differences in South Africa in comparison to other
countries.
Here are two examples, India and Mozambique (Note: The graph below is shown for only India and Mozambique. Fieldworkers
are instructed to explain intuitively the 5 steps as quintiles of the distribution).
In India the ladder is short, this means that the gap between the rich and the poor is not so big: In India, the rich earn 5
times more than the poor. In Mozambique, the ladder is longer, the rich are further away from the poor. The rich earn about
10 times more than the poor.
Here are some more examples of ladders in other countries. In Zimbabwe, the ladder is quite long, but in Holland it is quite
short. (Note: the ladder is shown for all countries except South Africa (i.e. India, Mozambique, US, Zimbabwe, Holland, Malawi)
How long do you think the ladder is in SA?
You said [respondent’s guess]. Actually, the ladder looks like this. In South Africa the rich earn more than 20 times the
income of poor people, the ladder is very long.
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Source: Data for this graph were taken from the 2007–2008 Human Development Report (Table 15). They represent the
ncome (or expenditure) of the 20 per cent richest divided by the income (expenditure) of the 20 per cent poorest in the
espective country.
ich-poor: SA only
We  would now like to show you some information about the income differences in South Africa.
[Show SA ladder from international treatment, but without labelling the y axis]
Here is a ladder that shows how big the difference between the rich and the poor is in South Africa. The rich are at the
op and the poor are at the bottom. How long the ladder is tells you how much the rich earn compared to the poor.
Q: “In your opinion, how many times more do the rich earn what the poor earn in South Africa?” [capture value]
You said [respondent’s guess]. Actually, the ladder looks like this. In South Africa the rich earn more than 20 times the
ncome of poor people, the ladder is very long.
ppendix C. Outcome questions
inq problem Do you think the gap between rich and poor is a serious problem in South Africa?
big  Some people propose a new government grant called the Basic Income Grant. This is a grant to all South Africans. This
would be different from existing social grants like the old age pension or the child support grant, because everybody
would get it. Do you support the introduction of a Basic Income Grant?
tax  top In South Africa, people must pay taxes depending on their income. Rich people pay about one third of their income as
taxes. For example, somebody who makes R60,000 per month pays R20,000 in taxes and keeps R40,000 for himself.
Do  you think RICH people should pay more, less or the same taxes?
action note If you feel strongly about the Basic Income Grant or taxes for the rich, you can take an action to express your opinion.
sms  You could send a SMS  to your ward councillor. The way  you can do this through our study is to send a SMS  to the
coordinator of our study and after we  are done with all the interviews, we  will send a message to your councillor
telling him which policies people in our study support. We will not tell him your name, just how many people in our
study  shared your opinion. Would you like to send a SMS  to express your opinion about any of these policies?
petition You can sign a petition expressing your opinion. At the end of our study, we  will forward this petition to South African
politicians letting them know which policies people in our study support. We will not tell them your name, just how
many  people in our study shared your opinion. Would you like to sign a petition?
petition taxes1 PETITION SUPPORTING AN INCREASE IN TOP MARGINAL TAX RATE Rich people in South Africa should contribute more
to  helping people get out of poverty. I support an increase of taxes for people earning more than 50.000 Rand per
month. This money should be used to help poor people.
petition taxes2 PETITION SUPPORTING A DECREASE IN TOP MARGINAL TAX RATE Rich people work hard for their income. I support a
DECREASE of taxes for people earning more than 50.000 Rand per month because effort should be rewarded in South
Africa.
petition big yes PETITION SUPPORTING THE INTRODUCTION OF A BASIC INCOME GRANT. Many South Africans are unemployed and
struggle to make a living. A basic income grant would help them to make ends meet. I support the introduction of a
new basic income grant.
petition big no PETITION AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF A BASIC INCOME GRANT. Government grants should be reserved for
people who  really need them such as old people and children. The basic income grant would deter people from
looking for a job. I am against the introduction of a basic income grant.
tax  white Some people say that WHITE South Africans should pay a special tax in addition to their normal taxes. Do you agree?
tax  gen Government officials often complain that there is not enough money to improve public infrastructures like schools,
roads, or sanitation. Do you think taxes should be higher so that the government has more money to improve this?
deserve Do you think that the rich in South Africa deserve their high incomes?
gov res Do you think that the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for or that
people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves? Choose a number on a scale from 1 to 10 to show
how  much you agree with these statements, where 1 means that the government should provide for people and 10
means  that people should provide for themselves.
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choice Imagine that a politician gives you the following choice: 1) get R150 in cash today, 2) the government introduces a
new grant that gives R50 per month to residents of this neighbourhood next year, 3) the government spends money to
improve the hospitals and clinics in your neighborhood.
cash Could you tell me  why  you prefer the R150 in cash? Answers: 1) I need the money now, 2) I don’t trust that the
government would keep the promise to introduce the grant or improve hospitals, 3) Other.  . .
grant  Could you tell me  why  you chose the R50 grant? Answers: 1) I think that the government should solve directly the
financial problems of people like me,  2) I’m not sure that the hospitals would really be improved, 3) Other.  . .
inq inevitable Do you think that the large gap between rich and poor in South Africa is inevitable? - it’s a fact of life || could be made
smaller
politicians care Do you think that making the gap between the rich and the poor smaller is important to South African political
leaders?
house Please have a look at this picture. What type of person do you think lives in this house? Answers (order randomized):
1)  A rich person, 2) A white per- son, 3) Other. .
Appendix D. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.jebo.2017.12.013.
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